Comparative Regional Studies (CRS) acts as an alternative research methodology designed to overcome the “crisis” of traditional Area Studies, which has often been criticized for its descriptive orientation, case-bound particularism, and lack of theoretical and methodological rigor. CRS actively incorporates comparative methodologies into Area Studies, internalizing an academic orientation that seeks universal understanding by moving beyond narrow, region-specific analyses toward broader, interconnected perspectives. Specifically, CRS pursues a balanced methodological duality between achieving deep contextual understanding of multiple regions and identifying causal linkages applicable across different world regions. It employs contextualized comparisons and qualitative comparisons as key strategies for bridging localized insight with generalizable theory. It also redefines the analytical unit of the “region” as a socially constructed, multilayered, and dynamic space shaped by discourse, interaction, and institutionalization. By situating regional comparison across multiple scales—from intra-regional to trans-regional—the CRS approach not only revitalizes qualitative inquiry but also expands the epistemological reach of Area Studies toward globally relevant theory-building. Ultimately, CRS envisions a methodological synthesis that enables scholars to move beyond region-bound description toward a genuinely comparative understanding of how regions function as both subjects and agents in an interconnected world.

Sectarian cleavages have long been central to understanding political conflict in the Middle East. Since the Iraq War, many violent confrontations have been framed as sectarian conflicts, particularly between actors aligned with Shi’a-majority Iran and those backed by Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia. Among them, Iran-supported armed non-state actors (ANSAs) such as Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), and the Houthis have emerged as powerful players, contributing to the intensification and prolongation of regional conflicts.
Despite the acknowledged importance of both sectarian identity and ANSAs in shaping Middle Eastern politics, little empirical evidence exists on whether support for such actors varies systematically across sectarian groups. Moreover, it remains unclear whether members of different sectarian communities evaluate the goals and actions of ANSAs differently.
To address these questions, we conducted original survey experiments in early 2025 in three key countries—Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen—each home to a prominent Iran-backed ANSA: Hezbollah, the PMU, and the Houthis, respectively. Our survey experiments measured levels of support for these actors and examined how such support varies by sectarian affiliation.
This study contributes to a growing body of research that seeks to move beyond elite-centric or geopolitical accounts by systematically analyzing the micro-level foundations of support for armed actors. By introducing experimental methods in three conflict-affected settings, the findings of this study offer new insights into the relationship between communal identity, perceived legitimacy, and political violence. The results have implications for understanding the durability of armed movements, the prospects for conflict resolution, and the nature of sectarian politics in the region.

This research investigates the shifting meanings of East Asian identity across the transpacific routes that link Southeast Asia and Latin America. Beginning with the establishment of Manila’s Chinatown—the oldest in the world—and moving to the arrival of Chinese indentured laborers (coolies) in 19th-century Yucatán, the presentation explores how early Asian migrants were racialized and absorbed into colonial hierarchies.
Drawing on the concept of Chinoism—a framework that emerges from interdisciplinary work on race, migration, and cultural consumption in postcolonial Latin America—I analyze how the figure of the Chinese coolie has been reimagined in contemporary fan cultures, particularly in relation to K-pop and Japanese pop media. Young Latin American audiences do not merely consume East Asian pop culture; they actively co-produce meanings through digital platforms, oscillating between exotic desire, emotional intimacy, and inherited colonial memory.
By tracing these historical and cultural continuities, this talk highlights the long-standing transpacific entanglements that have shaped Latin American perceptions of " Asia." In particular, I call attention to the shared colonial histories of the Philippines and Latin American countries—both once part of the Spanish Empire—to explore how media, migration, and memory converge in the making of racial imaginaries and affective cultural affinities.

This presentation draws on the creation of the Silk Road Virtual Museum, a digital exhibition project that reinterprets material, visual, and maritime histories of Asia through a comparative, transregional lens. Moving beyond conventional area-based boundaries, the museum reconstructs layered exchanges across East, Southeast, and South Asia—from the spread of silk production, to the development of music and musical instruments to shipwreck cargoes and regional ceramic production.
Rather than presenting discrete civilizational zones, the project emphasizes points of contact—ports, markets, migration corridors, and artistic idioms—as interpretive anchors. It also demonstrates how digital curation can visualize multi-scalar comparison, connecting the local and the global, the tactile and the conceptual. In doing so, it reflects and tests the broader ambitions of the Mega-Asia framework: to approach Asia not as a collection of bounded regions but as a dynamically entangled space.
The presentation will also reflect on the museum’s pedagogical function, building on my experience in establishing the BA in International Studies at Leiden University. It offers both a case study in applied comparative regional studies and a model for integrating scholarship, teaching, and public engagement in rethinking Asia.

In 2013, the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the National University of Singapore launched the Comparative Asian Studies (CAS) PhD Program. Structurally, the new program complemented an existing institutional commitment to the study of Asia via departments defined by national, regional, or cultural zones. Where students might dig deeply into “Southeast Asian”, South Asian”, “Malay”, or “Chinese Studies”, the CAS program was established to promote research across these areally defined regions via a more connected, relational, “trans-Asian” and “Inter-Asian” curriculum that reconceptualized how Asia might be studied, constructed, and understood. A core challenge was to develop a distinctive PhD curriculum that reflected these intellectual priorities while aligning the program with existing curricula, systems, and resources.

This paper provides a recollection of the context and process through which the CAS program was conceptualized and operationalized, focusing on the conversations, challenges and dynamics behind the scenes that led to the establishment of the program. It reflects primarily the perspective of the founding academic convener who, with the support of colleagues in the Asian Studies Division, developed the conceptual and operational framework for the degree program. The presentation suggests that the CAS emerged at a particular time and place by scholars within NUS and Singapore’s tertiary networks who anticipated that reimagining how the study of Asia might look from Asia was potentially strategic and intellectually innovative, especially at a time when ongoing calls to decolonize Asian Studies—and area studies more generally—was still the dominant starting point for students and researchers within the region.

In recent years, global democracy has faced mounting threats from the expansion of authoritarianism. This trend is particularly evident in Asia, where some countries have experienced military coups or are grappling with serious democratic backsliding. Confronted by both external authoritarian pressure and the rise of internal populism, maintaining a healthy democratic system has become increasingly challenging for many nations. Nevertheless, in 2024, seventy democratic countries around the world successfully held elections and formed new governments. These political transitions underscore the continued resilience of democratic institutions and reaffirm democracy as the preferred choice for the majority of global citizens.
Taiwan was among the nations that held successful elections in 2024. This study examines Taiwan’s democratic development in the face of global democratic challenges, and analyzes both the parallels and distinctions between Taiwan’s experience and that of other democracies. It seeks to decode the key factors shaping Taiwan’s democratic trajectory. More specifically, the study explores the evolution from the 2024 Bluebird Movement to the large-scale recall campaign of 2025, with a particular focus on the role of civil society in defending democracy and safeguarding national sovereignty.
We argue that Taiwan’s democratic development is unique. It is neither a mere replication of colonial political models nor a product of romanticized political idealism, nor has it been free of crises. Taiwan’s democracy is the result of a long and complex process of multiple transformations, frequently shadowed by crises. The country’s transition from a Cold War-era authoritarian regime to an open and liberal democracy has been continuously challenged by both internal and external threats. Externally, Taiwan faces persistent coercion and the threat of annexation by China. Internally, authoritarian tendencies and pro-China political forces have, for various reasons, aligned with Beijing’s divide-and-conquer strategy toward Taiwan. This dynamic has endured for decades and remains present even after three peaceful transitions of political power.
In light of these developments, this study is organized into four parts. Part I offers an introduction, emphasizing the unique features of Taiwan’s democratic evolution. Part II deconstructs the key factors influencing Taiwan’s democracy. Part III analyzes recent democratic developments, particularly the progression from the 2024 Bluebird Movement to the 2025 large-scale recall campaign, highlighting how the strength and leadership of civil society have underpinned Taiwan’s resilient democracy. Part IV concludes with a reflection on the lessons Taiwan’s experience may offer for other Indo-Pacific democracies and the potential for deepening democratic linkages in the region.

The 1992 democratic constitution of Mongolia declares that the State Great Khural (parliament with permanent legislative power) is the supreme representative body of the Mongolian people. Since 1992, the Parliament, which is the main institution for implementing representative democracy, has been elected 9 times up to now through general elections.

The Mongolian public is increasingly losing faith in the Parliament, which is a main institution of representative democracy. The number of people participating in the elections to elect the parliament has been decreasing as well since the 2000s. In this situation, the fear that the reputation of representative democracy will fall due to the bad reputation of the parliament, and a possible authoritarian regime will return, is becoming a stressful issue in discussions among academic scholars.

There are several real, practical questions in our parliament regarding the neutralization or inefficiency of representative democracy. For example, discriminating and bullying the newly elected members by joining the leadership (speaker) with the old chronic members. This is rude and embarrassing. Also, due to the mixed election system, since the last/2024, 78 out of 126 members of parliament were elected from constituencies, and 48 were elected from proportional lists. It is observed that members elected from constituencies take more interest in discussing and approving the public budget, influence the distribution of marginal budgets in their electoral constituencies, and then discriminate against members elected by party name list.

The biggest problem in representative democracy is that the ruling political party tries to make the parliament dependent on the political party by politically pressuring and pressuring the members elected to the parliament, preventing them from representing the views and interests of the voters in making parliamentary decisions, and reflecting the party's interests.

How is the Mongolian Parliament fulfilling its role as a representative democratic institution? What difficulties may the Parliament face in performing its role as an institution of representative democracy in the future? Parliamentary elections: election system changes and party influences on it. Party dominance over the state and parliament. MP's political reputation and its downfall. Why do Mongolians increasingly distrust the institution of representative democracy? Public trust in parliament, political parties, and MPs. Representative democracy institutions’ future. These are some issues and questions I wish to share my ideas and opinions on their reasons and results via the theory of representative democracy and its practice in Mongolia.

What happens to the idea of democracy when it is decentred from parliaments, elections, and state-led reforms? This paper explores the concept of “quiet democracies”—practices of political engagement rooted in memory, movement, and minoritarian resistance. Rather than focusing on formal institutions, it foregrounds the everyday struggles of marginalised communities across Asia who contest historical erasure, authoritarian resurgence, and developmentalist state agendas through subtle yet profound acts of remembrance and collective mobilisation. Focusing primarily on two cases—the commemorative practices of Tamil survivors in post-war Sri Lanka and the land and labour struggles of Indigenous communities in the Philippines—the paper examines how subaltern groups forge alternative democratic imaginaries. These practices include vigils, oral history projects, environmental protests, and embodied acts of refusal. They challenge dominant narratives of national unity and progress, sustaining claims to dignity, justice, and belonging from the margins. By reading memory and movement together, this paper rethinks democracy as an ongoing, plural process rather than a fixed institutional form. In doing so, it offers a new lens for understanding political life in South and Southeast Asia—one that takes seriously the quiet but enduring practices of subaltern resistance.

The term mega-Asia refers to the expansive economic and cultural sphere encompassing the wider Asian region, urbanization, and the clusters of megacities. It may also include networks among global cities and international population movements within the region. In this context, for a megacity to be established, it will likely need to function as a hub for information and collaboration networks. The Japanese government established a Committee for Regional Independence and Growth Policy. Their report indicated, mega-regions are precisely the entities that prevail in global competition, and the competitiveness is strengthened when multiple metropolitan areas collaborate for leveraging local strengths to become global centers of innovation in specific fields. In terms of regional collaboration, economic zones and industrial sectors are likely to be central, international cooperation can take many forms. However, various developments in international collaboration are also possible, including cross-border collaboration among civil society through nonprofit organizations and citizen groups. In this paper, I would like to examine collaboration among Japanese cities, focusing particularly on the international activities of local actors, and collaborative actions by people from diverse backgrounds.

Europe is a continent of complex migration — and mobilities. My presentation will offer a historical reflection on how European experiences may be compared to Asia, in relation to current theoretical and empirical developments, revisiting and updating a work previously published in 2009 ('Immigration, migration and free movement in the making of Europe', in Checkel/Katzenstein [eds.] European Identity), to reflect ongoing developments in European politics — notably restrictive EU laws and policies, regional inequalities, anti-immigration movements, and controversies over European colonialism.

Contemporary migration is a compelling force increasing diversity in globalising cities. In the postcolonial nation-city-state of Singapore, migration-led diversification driven by both globalization processes and rapid demographic ageing is transforming the multiracial nation-state. This presentation gives attention to the selective incorporation of a wide range of non-citizens of different skill levels, occupation, ethnicity, and nationality. While talent migrants (i.e. highly skilled professionals and entrepreneurs) are incentivized to take up permanent residency or citizenship and lay down roots (however, many choose to remain highly mobile and “flexible” in their citizenship options), labour migrants, particularly those considered low-skilled or performing 3D jobs, are locked into a “revolving-door” regime that enforces transience through the twin processes of enclavisation and enclosure. Within the intimate sphere of the family, diversification is driven by growing care deficits and the turning to global householding strategies from recruiting live-in domestic workers to transnational marriage migration. Migration is hence rapidly transforming the ‘multiracial template’ that has formed the basis of the imagined community of Singaporeans since independence. The ensuing identity politics of difference and sameness organized around ethnicity and nationality require more flexible management of race and migration while still capitalizing on the intrinsic strengths of a cosmopolitan society.

Reintegration governance has always been viewed from a Eurocentric perspective. Such view engenders a multi-level approach to reintegration that involves both state and non-state actors at different scales of governance – transnational, national, regional and local levels – particularly, as implementers of state-sanctioned deportation programs (Kuschminder and Saguin 2025, Geddes 2022). They are often dominated by large international organisations who extract much of the funding by the EU with often smaller involvement of local NGOs in the origin countries (Vollmer and Sahin-Mencutek 2023). This reinforces the logic that migration is inherently problematic and that migration actors should ensure migration flows are kept in check (Castles, Triandafyllidou 2022).
This paper follows Triandafyllidou’s (2022) call to decenter migration governance studies by shedding light on the pluralistic understanding of reintegration by different actors in a context outside Europe. It draws on an on-going the project on reintegration governance in the Philippines. The Philippines represents an exemplary case – as a leading labour sending country – that demonstrates multiple logics of reintegration governance within a single migration policy regime. Despite the remarkable degree of institutional stability of migration governance in the country (Asor and Cases 2024), reintegration governance can be differentiated into three different types: hierarchical, network and market. Strong state presence through hierarchical governance in reintegrating returnees manifest in high capacity local government units and national programs catered particularly to distressed migrant workers. Network governance manifest through the brokerage role of civil society organisations in not only coordinating how reintegration services are delivered but also by experimenting on innovative practices that the state can later on adopt. Market reintegration governance occurs when the state leaves the household and the community to reintegrate the often ‘economically-successful’ returnee. These different logics co-exists in Philippine reintegration governance but each reflects different dimension of the socio-economic conditions that shape migration in the country.

Japan has the highest proportion of elderly people in Asia, and a growing shortage of long-term care (LTC) workers has prompted the country to increasingly rely on foreign labor. Initially, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) was the sole official pathway for foreigners to enter Japan as LTC workers. However, since the late 2010s, several new migration schemes—such as the Technical Intern Training Program, Specified Skilled Worker visa, and student-based routes—have emerged. These non-EPA channels are perceived as more accessible for care facilities due to simplified recruitment processes, lower associated costs, and the potential for retaining workers over longer periods

This presentation offers a comparative analysis of these migration pathways, drawing on original questionnaire data and in-depth interviews with Indonesian LTC workers in Japan. It explores differences and similarities in migrants’ socio-economic backgrounds, financial costs of migration, employment conditions, workplace satisfaction, and return intentions

The findings highlight notable changes brought about by the diversification of entry routes. Non-EPA schemes have led to the recruitment of more individuals without prior healthcare or nursing education. Moreover, Japan’s national care certificate can be obtained without a formal examination under some schemes, raising concerns about the quality of care provided
The presentation argues that to ensure the sustainability and integrity of LTC in Japan, systemic improvements in working conditions and professional development opportunities across the sector are essential. It also calls for a broader public dialogue to establish a shared understanding of what constitutes “good” long-term care in an increasingly multicultural caregiving environment.

The study of social capital has long been central to debates on democracy and political change, yet its application to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has been limited. Conventional accounts often attribute this neglect to the region’s persistent authoritarianism and repeated failures of democratization. However, the Arab Spring revealed that mass mobilization and civic demands for reform were possible, suggesting that social capital—conceived as networks of trust, civic engagement, and collective action—operates in important and understudied ways. Despite the subsequent entrenchment of authoritarian politics, the persistence of civic activism and associational life indicates that social capital cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to political development. This study further integrates religion into the analysis, recognizing that religious beliefs, practices, and institutions often serve as critical sites of social capital formation in MENA societies. Mosques, religious charities, and faith-based networks not only shape norms of trust and reciprocity but also provide organizational infrastructures for both civic engagement and political mobilization. Drawing on Arab Barometer survey data, this study examines how religiosity interacts with social capital to influence political behavior and attitudes toward change. By situating the MENA case within broader comparative debates, this study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how social capital mediated through both secular and religious channels can simultaneously support democratic aspirations and reinforce authoritarian resilience.

This paper examines the beliefs and charitable behavior of three societal organizations (Ormas) in Jakarta: Pemuda Pancasila (PP), GP Ansor (NU-affiliated), and Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR). Based on our surveys with about 100 members each, findings show that members are mostly low-income, moderately to highly religious young and middle-aged men who join Ormas for ideological alignment and social security. They perform obligatory prayers and fasting, especially among Ansor members, and are generally tolerant of other religions. While practicing both mandatory almsgiving zakat and arbitrary charity sadaqah, they prefer direct donations over formal institutions, reflecting trust in local ties. Despite masculine norms (supporting gender equality with role distinctions and rejecting LGBT rights), members meet frequently (FBR > Ansor > PP), and some are exposed to smoking and drugs. Notably, many express concern for social inequality and engage actively in charitable giving—highlighting a critical but overlooked aspect of Ormas culture.

This study examines the dynamics of family and marriage values in contemporary Asia through the lens of "value proximity," a concept that captures attitudinal convergence and divergence across social groups beyond geographic boundaries. Drawing on original data from the 2022 Social Values Survey in Asian Cities (SVSAC), which surveyed 10,500 respondents in 15 major Asian and Western metropolitan areas, the study's researchers conducted a hierarchical clustering analysis on 120 population groups defined by city, gender, and age. The analysis yielded a six-cluster typology of value orientations, ranging from the "Lowest Low Egalitarian" to the "Big Family Traditionalist." Each cluster reflects distinct configurations of attitudes toward childbearing, gender roles, and intergenerational support.
The findings demonstrate that value proximities are shaped not only by regional legacies, such as Confucian or Islamic norms, but also by global forces, including digital connectivity and migration. It is noteworthy that clusters frequently transcend national boundaries, with specific age-gender groups in distant cities demonstrating a stronger value alignment with each other than with counterparts in their own locales. These findings are then contextualized within the framework of Hofstede's cultural dimensions, showing that shifts in values in Asia follow both unique and hybridized trajectories. The study makes a significant contribution to the field by offering a more nuanced understanding of demographic and cultural change in Asia, highlighting the interplay of structural, cultural, and transnational forces that shape evolving family and gender norms.

This study undertakes an innovative attempt to examine how the broader social value context shaped by adults is related to children’s subjective well-being in Asia. While previous research has often treated children’s well-being as a function of individual or family-level factors, much less attention has been paid to the societal environments in which children grow up. To address this gap, we combine two large-scale surveys: the Social Values Survey in Asian Cities (SVSAC), which collected data from representative samples of adults in 15 major Asian cities, and the International Survey of Children’s Well-Being (ISCWeB), a cross-national study of children conducted in 35 countries worldwide. For the purposes of this project, we restrict our analysis to Asian countries covered in both datasets, thereby enabling a unique opportunity to connect adult value orientations with child outcomes in the same cultural contexts.

We focus on four central dimensions of adult social values: attitudes toward gender roles, family and intergenerational relationships, meritocratic beliefs, and generalized social trust. Country-level averages of these orientations are constructed from SVSAC data and subsequently linked with children’s self-reported life satisfaction and happiness from ISCWeB. By situating children’s subjective well-being within the larger value climates of their societies, this study highlights the potential pathways through which social norms and adult beliefs shape young people’s perceptions of their lives.

This study represents a novel effort to bridge adult-centered and child-centered research traditions. By integrating data across two distinct but complementary surveys, it offers a fresh perspective on the intergenerational transmission of values and the societal determinants of child well-being in diverse Asian settings. The study thus aims to broaden the scope of well-being research by emphasizing the significance of cultural and normative contexts in shaping children’s lived experiences.

China-Rusia rapprochement has been started some time ago, soon after the collapse of the USSR, and since approximately 2014 Russia emerged as one of the major gas suppliers to China. All of this had led to a convenient cliché reemerging: China moves closer to Russia because both autocracies have common values or lack of any. Consequently, Western powers shall close their ranks to defend “democracy”/” rule of law” from the encroaching authoritarian International. These explanations were quite popular, at least until Trump’s advent. Still, it is hardly the workable explanation. Moscow had tried to be incorporated into the West for a long time, where Russian elites anticipated profitable deals. Its gas lines were aimed originally at the West. China direction emerged only because of problems with the West. The same is the case with China. Its turn to Moscow is due to common geopolitical interests. China also took advantage of Russia’s economic predicament: Western markets almost disappeared for Russian gas. Still, this rapprochement is a marriage of convenience. Beijing is fully aware that Russia still dreams to turn to the West or at least the USA. Consequently, China wants the most favorable conditions for itself. It demands heavy discounts and financing of the new gas line.

This paper explores the structural and cultural barriers to building sustainable civil society in Mongolia’s nomadic communities. While kinship-based networks and mutual aid have long underpinned nomadic resilience, these traditional forms of social organization often lack the institutional continuity and scale required for modern civic engagement. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork, historical analysis, and sociocultural theory, the study examines how mobility, seasonal dispersal, and a cultural ethos of individual autonomy constrain the emergence of enduring grassroots organizations.
A key structural factor is Mongolia’s vast and predominantly unowned land, which has historically enabled families to live far apart with minimal social dependence. This geographic separation is not only a physical reality but also shapes a distinct sense of property and responsibility. High social mobility and non-territorial concepts of ownership foster a worldview where issues are often managed by avoidance or relocation rather than collective resolution. As a result, nomadic societies tend to prioritize flexibility and disengagement over the formation of institutions to tackle shared problems.
In contrast to settled societies, where fixed residence and territorial permanence nurture “sense of place” and stable “trust networks,” Mongolia’s nomadic patterns disperse social capital and weaken mechanisms for collective accountability. Moreover, state-driven development initiatives often fail to align with these cultural dynamics, leading to institutional distrust and disengagement.
By comparing Mongolia’s case to civil society development in more sedentary contexts, the paper highlights the limitations of universalist civic models. It calls for a culturally grounded rethinking of what community and cooperation mean in structurally fluid societies. Rather than viewing nomadic societies as lacking, this research reveals alternate logics of social organization and contributes to broader debates on civil society in diverse cultural and spatial environments.

The connection between India and Korea dates back to 48 century AD when the princess of Ayodhya (India) Suriratna went to Korea in a boat and married the King Soro of Gaya dynasty. However the formal bilateral diplomatic ties was established in the year 1973 which emphasized on trade Promotion and Economic and Technological Co-operation between the two countries. It has continued to rise since then in the field of technology, automobile and education to name a few. As per Observer of Economic Complexity, South Korea's exports to India were $1.61 billion, while imports were $628 million, resulting in a trade surplus of $985 million for South Korea in May 2025. However very few people would know that apart from Samsung, LG, Hyundai KIA, khimchi and K-pop being a household name among the Indians and Indian movies being watched by the Koreans, there is something else which connects both the countries which is Buddhism. In fact Buddhism originated in India and was founded by Lord Buddha. It travelled to South Korea through the silk route in the first century via Tibet. The three monks who are considered to bring Buddhism to Korea are Malanta, who was an Indian monk, Sundo and Ado who were Chinese monks and propagated the teachings of Lord Buddha. As per records, approximately 40 percent of Koreans follow Buddhism as their way of life. Cultural and visits continued to take place by the monks to India and from Korea. In 526 CE, Korea monk Gyeomik went to India to learn Sanskrit and study the monastic discipline Vinaya, and founded the Gyeyuljong) branch of Buddhism that specializes in the study of Vinaya which derives directly from the Indian Vinaya School of Buddhism. Therefore, the basic objective of this panel is to make an analysis of the cultural diplomatic relations between India and Korea with reference to Buddhism as the connecting link between the two countries.

This study focuses on the unique form of Chōsen school nationalism fostered by Chōsen schools in Japan, aiming to reconsider the diversity of nationalism that cannot be contained within the framework of the nation-state, as well as the mechanisms of its formation as a representative example. Chōsen schools are often highlighted for their loyalty to North Korea or their perceived distinctiveness within Japanese society, and their connection to Chongryon (the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) is indeed a fact. However, in actual educational settings, these schools also function as sites for ethnic education and as spaces for identity formation for Zainichi Koreans living in Japanese society.
According to Han (2008), the nationalism nurtured in Chōsen schools is not that of the North or South Korean state, but rather an “abstracted nationalism” that is symbolic and
cultural. This kind of nationalism serves to reproduce a stable sense of community pride, removing the need for individuals to constantly search for their identity amidst instability. Despite the continued presence of institutional discrimination and social exclusion, the reason why Zainichi Koreans continue to choose Chōsen schools cannot be explained solely by external pressures. Instead, it reflects the historical reality that the Japanese nation-state has never fully incorporated Zainichi Koreans, as well as the internal merits provided by these schools such as a sense of ethnic pride and self-affirmation.
Traditionally, nationalism has often been described as an exclusive, state-centric political ideology, but this paper aims to return to nationalism as an inherently diverse and dynamic cultural construct. Furthermore, it draws attention to the fact that contemporary nationalism does not always take the nation as its sole unit, but can also be oriented towards smaller units such as ethnicity or religion, or towards larger units such as universal values. Through interviews with alumni, this study clarifies the values, pride, sense of distance from the state, and the concrete content and processes of nationalism as experienced in school life. By considering the cross-border norms that emerge from the abstracted nationalism of Zainichi Koreans, this study responds to the theme of the conference by reimagining Asia as a multilayered, transnational, and dynamic community.

Before 2016, populism was largely seen as a phenomenon of developing countries, but its spread to developed nations after 2016 marked a turning point in globalization, exposing deep challenges in both national and global governance. In Europe, populism stems from the influx of Middle Eastern immigrants, while in the United States it is closely tied to economic interdependence with East Asia, particularly China. Since World War II, East Asia and the U.S. have formed a cooperative model grounded in comparative advantage, free trade, and national credit. This “geese formation” industrial structure—beginning with Japan and followed by the NIES, ASEAN, China, and India—enabled mutual development through export-oriented growth toward the U.S. market.
However, the “Trump phenomenon” in 2016 revealed critical flaws in this model, especially the absence of distributive justice. Inequality within and between major economies, particularly the U.S. and China, became the root cause of rising tensions and the trade conflict. While Japan and the NIES achieved relatively equitable “shared growth,” China and Southeast Asian countries exhibit significant internal disparities, undermining sustainable development.
This paper argues that to restore balance, both China and the U.S. must pursue domestic reforms that enhance distributive justice and rebuild fairer economic structures. The ongoing U.S.–China trade confrontation reflects a finite, zero-sum game logic. Moving forward, global relations should evolve into an “infinite game” focused on long-term cooperation and mutual benefit. In this new paradigm, the goal is not to determine a single winner but to ensure the sustainability of interaction, allowing all participants to achieve shared prosperity through repeated cooperation.

The rise of the ‘Asian values’ discourse, particularly among ASEAN political leaders, has been interpreted as a response to a shared anxiety that the transplantation of Western political culture and institutions might undermine social cohesion. Similar concerns have been observed in Africa and the Middle East, both of which experienced colonial domination. However, the political implications of values-based discourses in these regions—particularly in relation to Islamic norms—have not been fully explored. This study focuses on the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a regional body that promotes Islamic values across its 57 member states, including Palestine (with Syria’s membership suspended since 2011).
Despite various intra-regional conflicts, the OIC has continuously pursued consensus- building around Islamic values and has actively disseminated them internationally. A notable example is its restrictive interpretation of freedom of expression, asserting that religious insults fall outside the legitimate bounds of that right. In a global context increasingly marked by divisions over values and the politicization of human rights discourse, it is important to investigate how ‘Islamic values’ are being constructed, legitimized, and contested in multilateral settings.
This presentation examines how Islamic values have been articulated in regional and international politics through an in-depth analysis of OIC resolutions and related documents. It explores the processes through which consensus has (or has not) been achieved, and whether internal contradictions or conflicts have emerged among member states. By doing so, the study sheds light on the normative dynamics within the OIC and contributes to a broader understanding of how value-based politics unfold in non-Western regional organizations.

This study investigates the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on remittance-receiving households in two migrant-sending villages in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, a region with a high rate of labor migration to Gulf countries. While macroeconomic data suggested resilience in remittance flows during the pandemic, this micro-level analysis reveals a contrasting reality. Based on household surveys and interviews, the study finds that most migrant households experienced a significant decline in remittances due to job losses, salary cuts, and mobility restrictions in host countries. Migrants and their families adopted various coping strategies, including borrowing from relatives and reducing consumption, to mitigate the economic shock.
The findings highlight the dual nature of migration as both a structural economic necessity and a deeply personal, agent-driven process. The pandemic exposed the vulnerabilities of transnational labor networks, particularly under the constraints of systems like the Gulf’s kafala sponsorship regime. Despite these challenges, the study also underscores the resilience of migrant households and the importance of remittances in sustaining livelihoods, education, and social mobility.
This research contributes to a nuanced understanding of migration in Asia by illustrating how global crises reshape transnational connections and household strategies. It also raises critical questions about the inclusivity of state welfare programs, as none of the surveyed households received government assistance during the pandemic. The study calls for more responsive immigration governance and social protection mechanisms that account for the lived experiences of migrants and their families in times of global disruption.

In Nepal, the number of people emigrating has increased rapidly over the past 20 years. Consequently, many Nepali families have dispersed worldwide. To cope with this sudden change, these families have leveraged Information and Communication Technology (ICT), which has become widespread over the past decade.
This study aims to clarify the changes in family structure due to emigration and how ICT bridges those families, based on anthropological research conducted with families remaining in Nepal and young people of Nepali origin living in abroad. Close family relationships that have been built over time through daily life have been physically altered by increased emigration. However, family members who are physically far apart keep in touch with each other daily via digital communication platforms and share information and emotions.
ICT functions to connect and re-establish family ties. However, in some cases, ICT fosters entirely new family relationships, distinct from previous forms. There are also limitations, such as the fact that the conversation can be suddenly cut off depending on the network situation and communication through a small screen.
Based on these examples, this study considers the impact and potential of ICT technology on Nepali families who have migrated abroad and those who have remained in Nepal.

This study examines the mobile phone industry as a crucial sector where the dynamics of competition and cooperation among East Asian economies are shaping a new techno-regional order. A qualitative method is used, with data collected through a literature review. This study uses the "Mega-Asia" framework to highlight the interconnections and rivalries shaping the region's industrial landscape. It focuses on key players such as China, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan to demonstrate how competitive and collaborative relationships shape the sector's progress. China's strong manufacturing capabilities and rapidly growing brands coexist and compete with South Korea's Samsung, Japanese component manufacturers, and Taiwan's leading semiconductor companies, creating a complex web of interdependencies and competition. These interconnections are evident in the highly interdependent manufacturing chain, including semiconductor production largely carried out by TSMC in Taiwan, camera components by Japanese companies, and final assembly and brand development primarily in China, South Korea, and Taiwan. Companies leverage cross-border capabilities to build complementary global value chains. For example, Samsung manufactures processors and display panels in Korea but assembles devices in Vietnam and China, working with global partners for production and distribution. Companies and governments continue to struggle for market dominance, technological leadership, and position themselves in the value chain. In domestic and global markets, Chinese brands such as Xiaomi, OPPO, and Vivo compete directly with Samsung and Japanese and Taiwanese high-tech manufacturers. Geopolitical tensions, such as trade disputes and technological competition between China, the United States, and East Asian countries, are increasing competitiveness and influencing national industrial policies. Finally, these findings highlight the complexity of East Asian mobile phone industry integration, where cooperation and competition coexist while redefining regional economic geography. This research contributes to understanding the development of Asian regionalism by situating technological competition within a broader socio-political and economic context.

Bengal and the Malay world are situated at the northeastern frontier of the Indian Ocean rim, and the Bay of Bengal is a key player in establishing maritime connectivity between the two regions. Besides, Bengal created a land bridge between South and Southeast Asia through the Myanmar-Thailand border. Historians and archaeologists have suggested that there was a transregional exchange of commodities and culture between Bengal and the Malay Peninsula during the ancient and medieval periods. Such transregional connectivity underwent a significant shift with the advent of British colonialism, a development that remains an issue yet to be addressed. The British colonial authority unified Bengal and the Malay world under a single administration based in Calcutta. Administrative linkages created opportunities in various capacities for jobs and networks. Besides, literary works documented colonial environment and culture across the British Empire in Bengal and British Malaya. This paper aims to examine textual flows, transregional connectivity, and mobility between the two coastal regions during the colonial period. In doing so, this paper interrogates three interrelated issues. First, it presents a detailed narrative of Bengal in Malay literature and Malay society through the lens of Bengali migrants. Second, it relates to the administrative linkages and the inland and maritime networks between Bengal and mainland Southeast Asia. These connections facilitated the Bengali mobility and space-making in port cities of the Malay world. Therefore, the third set of issues highlights the Bengali migration and social spaces within Malay society. By employing a historical methodology that relies on a range of archival and secondary sources, this paper demonstrates that transregional networks facilitated Bengali migration and diaspora during the colonial period, a phenomenon that continues to date. Broadly, this research might lead to a deeper understanding of transregional connectivity and human mobility in the Indian Ocean world.

This paper reconsiders the medieval Malabar Coast—today’s southwestern coast of India and a key region of South Asia—as a critical maritime node in the historical geography of pre-modern Asia. It highlights how regional spaces like Malabar shaped broader interregional structures that connected South Asia, West Asia, Southeast Asia, and beyond. Long portrayed in colonial historiography as a passive site of spice extraction, Malabar gained scholarly prominence through the Indian Ocean-focused works of K.N. Chaudhuri, M.N. Pearson, and Ashin Das Gupta. Their emphasis on maritime connectivity inspired a wider rethinking of oceanic linkages and the spatial dynamics of Asian civilization.
Building on this scholarship, the paper argues that Malabar functioned as an active mediating space for interregional exchanges well before European arrival. Central to this reconceptualization is the monsoon system—not merely as an environmental backdrop, but as a structuring force that shaped sailing schedules, port rhythms, and commodity flows. Prior to the steamship era, monsoon-driven navigation necessitated long layovers and staggered voyages, making Malabar a crucial entrepôt connecting the Red Sea and Persian Gulf regions with Southeast Asia and China.
Challenging Eurocentric narratives that portray Asian trade as oriented solely around elite luxuries, this study highlights the circulation of everyday commodities—rice, cloth, coconut, timber—alongside high-value spices.
By situating Malabar within transregional monsoon rhythms and multi-commodity circuits, the paper contributes to a decolonized understanding of South Asia’s role in constructing the broader Asian maritime world. It illuminates how regional nodes like Malabar underpinned the connectivity of Asia centuries before the advent of Europeans in Asia.

This paper explores how imperial botany adapted to tropical climates and flora across Asia through the case of Hayata Bunzō (早田 文藏, 1874–1934), an eminent plant taxonomist in the Empire of Japan. Considered as one of the founding figures of modern botany in Taiwan, Hayata named about 1,600 plant species in colonial Taiwan (Formosa) and published widely with the support of the Government-General of Taiwan. However, Hayata’s contribution extended beyond simply cataloguing “discovered” plants in Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Based on his extensive, long-term fieldwork across tropical Asia, he also developed unique ideas and scientific theories about plant identification, classification, and evolutionism that I analyze through the concept of “tropicalization.” As a field botanist trained in temperate and sub-tropical climates of the Japanese Archipelago, he was first awed by vibrant plant worlds in tropical Asia. Over decades of work in Taiwan and Southeast Asia under the auspice of Japanese Empire, Hayata worked closely with local plants, climatic conditions, and informants to re-train—or “tropicalize”—his scientific sensibilities toward tropical ecologies in Asia. This process involved adapting his observational practices and analytical frameworks to tropical climates and flora, fundamentally reshaping his scientific expertise and identity. Through analysis of his biographies, publications, unpublished materials, specimens, and botanical illustrations, I examine how tropicalization became integral to knowledge production about tropical Asia. The paper highlights the role of affective encounters in shaping scientific expertise and imperial authority, while tracing Hayata’s transformative itineraries across tropical Asia. I suggest that his fraught legacy provides a critical vantage point on shifting environmental, scientific, and political connections between East Asia and Southeast Asia within the framework of Mega-Asia. By showing how the temperate engaged with the tropical across Asia, the paper also contributes to recontextualizing inter-Asian connections in a rapidly warming world.

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